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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-THE CLEAR MEANING OF AMBIGUITY,
DAVIS v. UNITED STATES, 114 S. Ct. 2350 (1994).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Davis v. United States,' the United States Supreme Court
considered the appropriate response by law enforcement officers when
a suspect makes an ambiguous or equivocal reference to an attorney
or the need for representation during a custodial interrogation. The
officers' response to such a reference is important because if the
suspect were to request that counsel be present during a custodial
interrogation, invoking the Fifth Amendment right to counsel,2 then
the police officers would be required to end the interrogation im-
mediately.3 During Davis's interrogation, he said, "Maybe I should
talk to a lawyer." '4 The Supreme Court held that after a suspect
has knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights,5 the in-
terrogating officers may disregard the subsequent ambiguous ref-
erence to an attorney until and unless the suspect makes a clear
request for the assistance of counsel. 6 The Court declined to adopt
a rule requiring officers to cease interrogation and ask clarifying
questions in order to ascertain whether the suspect intended to invoke
the right to counsel.
7
This note examines the development of the Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination and the judicially created Miranda
rules protecting that right. Further, this note examines the practical
application of the rule from Davis as well as the potential conse-
quences to follow.
II. FACTS
Petitioner, Robert L. Davis, was convicted of the unpremeditated
murder of Seaman Apprentice Keith Shackleton and was sentenced
1. 114 S. Ct. 2350 (1994).
2. "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3. Edwards v. Arizona, 452 U.S. 973 (1981) (holding that once a suspect
requests counsel, the suspect is not subject to any further questions until either
counsel is available or the suspect initiates further communication with the police).
4. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2353.
5. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966). The Miranda Court
held when an individual is taken into custody or significantly deprived of his
freedom by authorities and is subject to questioning, he must be advised of his
Miranda rights; these right include the right to remain silent and a court-appointed
attorney if the suspect is unable to afford counsel. Id. at 479.
6. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2356.
7. Id.
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to life imprisonment.' Shackleton was found dead behind the Charles-
ton Naval Base on October 3, 1988, having suffered head injuries
inflicted by a blunt object, possibly a pool cue. 9 The victim was
last seen alive playing pool in the Enlisted Men's Club located on
the base the evening before his body was found. 0 During the ensuing
investigation, the Naval Investigation Service (NIS) focused on which
patrons of the club owned pool cues because the club did not allow
its cues to be removed from the premises."
As a result of routine interviewing, NIS Special Agent (SA)
Sentell learned that Davis was at the club the night of the murder. 2
The next day, October 19th, NIS agents went aboard Davis's ship
to interview him, but he was absent from his post without authority. 3
When Davis returned to duty on October 20th, the NIS agents
returned to conduct the interview, explaining to Davis's command
that he was a potential witness. 14 Before the interview was conducted,
the ship's executive officer informed the agents that Davis was being
referred for a mental status evaluation for making violent statements
concerning his desire to shoot someone, in particular a police officer. 5
During the October 20th interview, Davis was not advised of
his rights because he was not considered a suspect at that time. 6
Davis confirmed that he was at the club on the night of October
2nd and identified a picture of the victim, stating that he had played
pool with him before. 7 His interview lasted approximately thirty
minutes. 8 Davis also provided the agents with his pool cues and
8. United States v. Davis, 36 M.J. 337, 338 (1992), aff'd, 114 S. Ct. 2350
(1994).
9. Id. at 338. The pathologist reported that the injuries appeared to be inflicted
with a "long tubular shock-absorbing object" and that the butt end of a pool cue
could have been the weapon used in the attack. Id.
10. Id. Later, the Naval Investigative Service learned that Davis and Shackleton
were laying pool in tiI. club al Lilat hal.elLtoll iiau IUa L LU oVi aiiU
refused to pay. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2352-53.
11. Id. at 2353. NIS interviewed between 100 to 250 people during the inves-
tigation. Davis, 36 M.J. at 338.
12. Davis, 36 M.J. at 338. Two sailors interviewed told SA Sentell that Davis




16. Id. at 339. He was not considered a suspect because Shackleton was beaten,
not shot. Id. at 338. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966) (holding
that when an individual is taken into custody or significantly deprived of his
freedom by authorities and is subject to questioning, he must be advised of his
Miranda rights).
17. Davis, 36 M.J. at 339.




pointed out a red stain on the cue case, saying at first that it was
ketchup, then later that it could be his own blood.19
On November 1st, NIS was informed that Davis had admitted
to killing Shackleton, and from that time, Davis was regarded as
a suspect.20 Three days later, on November 4th, Davis was again
interviewed by NIS agents; this time he was advised of his Article
31(b) rights2I as well as his Fifth Amendment right to counsel.
22
Davis signed a written waiver of rights and agreed to answer ques-
tions .23
During the interview, Davis said, "Maybe I should talk to a
lawyer." ' 24 SA Sentell immediately stopped the interrogation and
asked Davis to clarify whether he was asking for a lawyer or just
making a comment about a lawyer.25 SA Sentell testified that Davis
said, "No, I'm not asking for a lawyer," and then said, "No, I
don't want a lawyer.
' 26
After clarifying Davis's statement concerning a lawyer, the agents
took a break before resuming the interview. 27 When they returned,
the agents reminded Davis of his rights but did not repeat his rights
in full or ask him to sign another waiver. 21 Shortly after the interview
resumed, Davis told SA Sentell, "I think I want a lawyer before
I say anything else." '29 The interview ended at that point.30
19. Id. Pool cues were also collected from three other people. Id.
20. Id. This information was provided by Petty Officer Mull, to whom Davis
had admitted the crime. Id.
21. Id. Article 31, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 831, provides
as follows:
(b) No person subject to this chapter may interrogate, or request any
statement from, an accused or a person suspected of an offense without
first informing him of the nature of the accusation and advising him that
he does not have to make any statement regarding the offense of which
he is accused or suspected and that any statement made by him may be
used as evidence against him in a trial by court martial.
Id.
22. Davis, 36 M.J. at 339. "No person . . .shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
23. Davis, 36 M.J. at 339. Davis's stated reason for agreeing to be questioned
was "because he didn't kill anyone." Id.
24. Id. at 339-40.
25. Id. at 340. SA Sentell testified that "[We] made it very clear that we're
not here to violate his rights, that if he wants a lawyer, then we will stop any
kind of questioning with him, that we weren't going to pursue the matter unless
we have it clarified is he asking for a lawyer or is he just making a comment







During his court-martial, Davis sought to have the statement
he made during the interview on November 4th suppressed, arguing
that the fruits of that interview were obtained after he made a
request for counsel." The military judge denied his motion to sup-
press. Davis was convicted of unpremeditated murder and sentenced
to life imprisonment.32
On appeal, the United States Court of Military Appeals affirmed
the military trial judge's decision to deny the motion to suppress
Davis's statement made during the interview.33 The appellate court
agreed with the military judge that Davis's comment, "Maybe I
should talk to a lawyer," did not invoke his right to counsel at
that point.3 4 The court of appeals also found that the information
received during the November 4th interview was properly admitted
into evidence. 5
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve
the issue of ambiguous references to counsel made by suspects during
custodial questioning by the police.16 The Supreme Court's acceptance
of this case was based on the lack of uniformity in decisions among
the lower courts." The Court held that when Davis made the am-
biguous statement concerning a lawyer, the NIS agents were not
required to stop the interview.38 The Court further held that it was
proper, although not required, for the agents to clarify whether
Davis did or did not wish to speak to a lawyer.3 9 The Court affirmed
the judgment of the Court of Military Appeals, finding no grounds
for the suppression of Davis's statement. °
III. HiSTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
The roots of the Fifth Amendment-based right to counsel are
embedded in English common law.4 1 The privilege against self-in-
31. Id. at 341.
32. Id. at 338.
33. Id. at 342.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 341.
36. Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 379 (1993) (granting petition for writ
of certiorari).
37. Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2354 (1994). See infra text ac-
companying notes 90-118 for a discussion of the differing approaches among the
lower courts.
38. Id. at 2356.
39. Id. The Court, although calling the option of asking clarifying questions
"good police practice," declined to require this procedure. Id.
40. Id. at 2357.
41. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 442-45 (1966).
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crimination initially began as a judicial reaction to the brutal methods
used in England during interrogation to force the suspect to confess.42
This belief in suspects' rights was transplanted in the United States
by the English settlers in colonial America and was considered of
such vital importance that it was included among the fundamental
principles of the United States.
43
Nevertheless, while a suspect has traditionally been entitled to
the privilege not to incriminate himself, the Fifth Amendment has
not always been interpreted to extend a right to counsel during a
custodial interrogation by the police. Originally, the right to counsel
was seen only as a Sixth Amendment right, which only arose when
formal criminal proceedings were initiated."
Slowly, case law developed to ensure that a suspect's Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination was protected. In 1897,
the Court established a rule based on the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause, which required that whenever the question arose as
to whether the confession was voluntary, it would be determined in
favor of the accused. 45 Over eighty years later, in 1963, the Court
held that if the suspect had requested and been denied the opportunity
to confer with counsel while in custody and had not been effectively
warned of his constitutional right to remain silent, his constitutional
rights under the Sixth Amendment4 were violated.47 Thereafter, any
statement elicited by the officers during interrogation could not be
introduced at trial.48
42. Id. at 443.
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 187-88 (1984) (explaining
that the Sixth Amendment is invoked only after formal criminal proceedings are
initiated, such as a formal charge, information, preliminary hearing, arraignment,
or indictment).
45. Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 565 (1897) (basing its decision on
the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, this Court held that the trial court
erred in admitting the defendant's confession because he had been unduly influenced).
46. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him;
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
47. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 491 (1963). See also Kirby v. Illinois,
406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972) (noting that in retrospect, the Court perceives that the
purpose of Escobedo was not to uphold the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
but to guarantee the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination).
48. Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 490.
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In 1964, an issue came before the United States Supreme Court
in Malloy v. Hogan49 that directly affected the later development
of the Fifth Amendment right to counsel. The Court considered
whether the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination applied
to state court proceedings as in the federal system.5 0 During the
Warren Court Era, the Court was struggling with whether states
were required to extend the protections of the Bill of Rights to its
citizens or whether those rights only pertained to federal government
action." In a controversial opinion, the Court held that Malloy
enjoyed the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in
his state court proceedings through the application of the Fourteenth
Amendment5 2 which guarantees a defendant the right to due process
of law. 3 The Court rejected the view that the Fourteenth Amendment
applies to the states in a "watered-down, subjective version of the
individual guarantees of the Bill of Rights. ' '5 4 Instead, the Court
decided that no justification exists for maintaining different standards
to determine the validity of an invocation of constitutional privilege
based merely on whether the defendant is tried in a state or federal
court. 5 Thus, the same standards must be applied to determine
whether the defendant properly invoked his rights regardless of
whether he is in federal or state court.56 It is through the Fourteenth
Amendment that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrim-
ination becomes applicable to the states. 7
Two years later in Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court
recognized the need for a protective rule to establish a safeguard
for the suspect's Fifth Amendment right against compulsory self-
incrimination. 8 In Miranda, the Court held that a suspect must be
49. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
50. Id. at 3. Mailoy refused to answer any questions in regard to alleged
gambling and other criminal activities "on the grounds it may tend to incriminate
me." Id.
51. Id. at 4-5.
52. Id. at 6. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... ." U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
53. Malloy, 378 U.S. at 6.
54. Id. at 10-11 (quoting Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 275 (1960)
(dissenting opinion)).
55. Id. at 11.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 6. "We hold today that the Fifth Amendment's exception from
compulsory self-incrimination is also protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against
abridgement by the States." Id.
58. 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (noting that widespread abuse by police officers, such
[Vol. 17:795
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clearly advised of his right to remain silent, and that anything he
says can be used against him in court proceedings. 9 The suspect
must also be informed of his right to counsel and advised that if
he is unable to afford counsel, one will be appointed for him. 6°
The Court went on to hold that, after being advised of these rights,
the suspect can choose to waive the rights and answer questions.
61
Nevertheless, if during questioning, the suspect indicates in any
manner that he has decided to reinvoke the right to counsel or
silence, the officers must immediately end the interrogation.
62
The Miranda rule has a two-fold purpose; it protects the suspect's
constitutional rights and insures that the confession made will not
be rendered inadmissible. 63 In Miranda, the Court noted that because
interrogations of in-custody suspects are by their nature coercive, 64
as beating, hanging, and whipping was being used to elicit confessions). See, e.g.,
Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 531 (1963) (denouncing the police tactic of
threatening a widow with losing custody of her two children if she did not confess);
Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 559-60 (1954) (refusing to admit a confession
obtained by employing a highly trained psychiatrist and withholding medical treat-
ment to elicit a confession); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 407 (1945)
(condemning the practice of stripping defendant of his clothes and allowing him
to believe the police were going to beat him to force the defendant to confess);
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 231 (1940) (denouncing the use of physical
and emotional mistreatment until all four defendants were desperate and in fear
of their lives in order to get a confession); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278,
281 (1936) (condemning the use of eliciting confessions from defendants by hanging
one by a rope in a tree and whipping all three severely).
59. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
60. Id.
61. Id. Before the Miranda decision, the Court used the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment ("No State shall . .. deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .") to rule confessions in-
voluntary. See Craig R. Johnson, Note, McNeil v. Wisconsin: Blurring a Bright
Line on Custodial Interrogation, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 1643 (1992) (discussing the
differences between the Fifth and Sixth Amendments). See also Brown v. Mississippi,
297 U.S. 278 (1936) (using the Fourteenth Amendment to overturn a conviction
based on a statement elicited after the defendants were severely beaten).
62. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45. In 1976, Ernesto Miranda himself became a
victim, stabbed to death in a Phoenix, Arizona flophouse. LIVA BAKER, MIRANDA:
CRIME, LAW AND POLITICs 408 (1983). Perhaps one of the greatest Constitutional
ironies is that, at the scene of the crime, the accomplice to Ernesto Miranda's
killer was read his Miranda rights, in English and Spanish, before being taken to
police headquarters. Id.
63. Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2360 (1994) (Souter, J. dissenting).
See also Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426 (1985) (stating that "Miranda
attempted to reconcile [competing] concerns by giving the defendant the power to
exert some control over the course of the interrogation.").
64. In-custody interrogations are by nature coercive because they are attempts
to elicit admissions from suspects that they would not normally admit. Miranda,
384 U.S. at 467.
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the suspect must be completely apprised of his Fifth Amendment
rights. 65 If he chooses to exercise these rights, his wishes must be
honored. 66
Miranda v. Arizona is the foundation of the evolving case law
concerning the Fifth Amendment right to counsel. Two major cat-
egories of Fifth Amendment cases since Miranda present two ques-
tions: 1) what constitutes a valid waiver of the Miranda rights, and
2) how must a suspect properly invoke his Miranda rights.
A. Valid Waiver
In 1979, the issue of what constitutes a valid waiver of the
Fifth Amendment right to counsel came before the United States
Supreme Court in North Carolina v. Butler.67 The Court held that
an express written or oral statement is not required to show that
the suspect knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights. 6 While
silence alone is not enough, the Court refused to hold that silence,
coupled with an understanding of the right to counsel and with
conduct indicating a waiver of that right, could never support a
finding that a suspect had waived his right to counsel, as the North
Carolina Supreme Court had held. 69 The Court based this decision
on prior case law which held that whether the suspect has knowingly
and voluntarily made an effective waiver depends on the facts and
65. Id. But see G. EDWARD WHITE, EARL WARREN: A PUBLIC LIFE 271 (1982)
(stating that the problem with the view that interrogating officers and suspects
should be on equal footing is that "[allthough interrogated persons are technically
presumed to be innocent of potential charges, as a practical matter a system of
law enforcement has to presume potential guilt in detained suspects to justify their
detention" and that the fairneq princinle of M'iranda ignores the necessity of giving
officers certain advantages in order to do their jobs).
66. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467. See also Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975)
(concluding that whether a statement obtained after the suspect has invoked his
Fifth Amendment right to remain silent is admissible will depend on whether the
assertion of those rights was completely honored).
67. 441 U.S. 369 (1979).
68. Id. at 369.
A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of
a known right or privilege. The determination of whether there has been
an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each case,
upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including
the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1937).
69. Butler, 441 U.S. at 373.
[Vol. 17:795
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circumstances in that particular case, including the suspect's
background, experience, and conduct-7
Two years later, the waiver issue came before the Court again
in Edwards v. Arizona.7 The defendant, Robert Edwards, invoked
his right to counsel during interrogation.7" Nevertheless, the next
day Edwards was forced to speak with police again and subsequently
made incriminating statements." As to whether Edwards had
subsequently waived his invoked right to counsel, the Court reiterated
that in order to waive that right, the waiver must be voluntary and
constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment of a known
right. 74 To effectively waive this right, there must be more than the
suspect's response to further questioning by police. 7 The Court
established a second layer of protection for suspects held in police
custody by ruling that after a suspect requests counsel, the suspect
is not subject to further interrogation until either counsel is available
or the suspect initiates further communication with the police.
76
In 1990, the Court clarified the holding in Edwards when it
decided Minnick v. Mississippi.77 Reasoning that a single meeting
with a lawyer will not protect a suspect from the coercive nature
of custodial interrogation, the Court held that once counsel has been
requested, all interrogation must end and cannot be re-initiated




B. Proper Invocation of Fifth Amendment Rights
In 1984, a question arose in Smith v. Illinois79 concerning how
a suspect properly invokes the Fifth Amendment right to counsel.
70. Id. at 374-75 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1937)).
71. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
72. Id. at 477, 479.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 482. See also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1937).
75. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484. Edwards is "designed to prevent police from
badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights." Michigan
v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 346 (1990). In Harvey, the Court ruled that the defendant's
statement was inadmissible because it was given after he was discouraged from
speaking with a lawyer because "his lawyer was going to get a copy of the statement
anyway." Id.
76. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85.
77. 498 U.S. 146 (1990).
78. Id. at 146.
79. 469 U.S. 91 (1984). In a case related to the same issue of waiver, the Court
decided Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988). In Roberson, three days after
1995]
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In Smith, the defendant was advised of his Miranda rights."0 In
reference to the right to counsel, he said, "Uh, yeah. I'd like to
do that." 8' The police continued asking questions about the request
for counsel and the suspect ambiguously agreed to be interrogated.
2
His motion to suppress the statement given was denied and he was
convicted. 3 The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that
the trial court must first determine whether the suspect actually
invoked the right to counsel.8 4 If the trial court determines such an
invocation was made, it must then apply the "bright-line rule" from
Edwards, requiring that the suspect both initiate further
communication with the police and knowingly and intelligently waive
the right he had invoked in order for his responses to be admitted
into evidence. 5
However, the Court did not specify what should be construed
as a proper invocation and declined to address the issue of ambiguous
statements, finding instead that the defendant's statement in Smith
was neither ambiguous nor unclear.8 6 The Court did state that all
questioning must cease when neither the request nor the events leading
up to the request indicate ambiguity. 7 Thereafter, any subsequent
statements made by the suspect are relevant only as to whether the
right he had invoked has now been waived. 8 The Court held that
the defendant invoked his Fifth Amendment right, an officer, unaware of the
invocation, questioned the defendant about another crime and elicited an incrim-
inating statement that was later suppressed at trial. Id. at 678. Affirming the trial
court's decision, the Supreme Court held that once the request has been made, all
interrogation is barred, regardless of how many crimes the defendant is accused
of. Id. at 682-88.
80. Smith, 469 U.S. at 92-93.
81. Id. at 93.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 94.
84. Id. at 95, 98.
85. Id. at 95. But see Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523 (1987) (rejecting
the argument that because the defendant distinguished between written and oral
statements, this indicated that he did not understand the consequences of his
statement to waive his Fifth Amendment rights effectively); cf. Charles J. Williams,
Comment, Connecticut v. Barrett And The Limited Invocation Of The Right To
Counsel: A New Limitation On Fifth Amendment Miranda Protections, 73 IOWA
L. REv. 743 (1988). The author advocates that "the test should be whether a
reasonable person who fully understood the right to have counsel present during
an interrogation would act as the suspect did." Id. at 763.
86. Smith, 469 U.S. at 99-100,




any answers to further questioning after the suspect requests counsel
may not be used to cast doubt on the clarity of the initial request
itself. 89
Among the lower courts, three distinct positions had developed
prior to Davis v. United States9° in order to deal with the problem
of ambiguity. Each approach placed different burdens of clarity
upon the suspect and provided vastly different degrees of protection
for the suspect's Fifth Amendment right to counsel.
First, some courts took the position that an equivocal request
for counsel by the suspect is sufficient in order to invoke the Fifth
Amendment privilege. 91 This approach provided the greatest amount
of protection against any rights violation by presuming the suspect
has invoked the right to counsel by the equivocal request. 92 An
example of this view is found in Maglio v. Jago,93 a Sixth Circuit
decision remanding a conviction based on a confession given after
the defendant had attempted to assert his Fifth Amendment right
to counsel. 94 When the interrogating officer asked Daniel Maglio if
he would waive his rights and answer questions, Maglio replied,
"Maybe I should have an attorney." 95 The officer told him he would
have to wait until the following day to have an appointed lawyer.
96
The officer then continued asking questions until Maglio confessed
to murder. 97 Over Maglio's objections, the confessions were admitted
89. Id. at 98-99.
90. 114 S. Ct. 2350 (1994).
91. Charles R. Shreffler, Jr., Note, Judicial Approaches To The Ambiguous
Request For Counsel Since Miranda v. Arizona, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 460,
468 (1987).
92. Id. at 468. See People v. Duran, 189 Cal. Rptr. 595 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983)
(using the approach that any reference, regardless of how ambiguous, is sufficient
to invoke the right to counsel and stop the interrogation), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
991 (1983).
93. 580 F.2d 202 (6th Cir. 1978).
94. Id. at 207-08. The Court held that a new trial was necessary because Maglio's
confessions were obtained in violation of his constitutional right to assistance of
counsel. Id. at 207.
95. Id. at 203. Daniel Maglio was a 16-year-old runaway and had been arrested
when found driving a car belonging to a man who had been found dead earlier
in the day. Id. at 202-03. During the interrogation, the officer told Maglio that
he was not required to speak without counsel. Id. at 203. Nevertheless, the officer
continued asking questions regarding how Maglio got the car. Id. Forty-five minutes
after confessing to the officers, the prosecutor arrived to tape the confession. Id.
The prosecutor re-explained to Maglio his rights. Id. When asked whether he
understood that an attorney would be appointed if he could not afford one, he
replied, "I understand it now. ft's not the way it seemed before, but it doesn't
matter." Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 203.
19951
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into evidence and he was convicted of murder. 98 The Sixth Circuit
found that Maglio was attempting to assert his right to counsel by
his ambiguous statement. 99 The court based this finding on the
language in Miranda, interpreting it to mandate that questioning
must stop if the defendant "indicates [iun any manner and at any
stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney
before speaking."'0 The Court of Appeals held that Maglio was
denied his Fifth Amendment right to counsel and remanded the case
for a new trial. 0 1
The second approach required the interrogating officers to ask
clarifying questions to determine whether the suspect has requested
counsel by his ambiguous reference. 0 2 This position shifted the
burden to the interrogating officers to ensure that the suspect's rights
are adequately protected. 03 An example of this approach is Thompson
v. Wainwright, a Fifth Circuit decision. 0 4 During a custodial
interrogation, Larry Thompson was advised of his Miranda rights
and signed a waiver card. 05 He then told the officers he was willing
to make a statement but that he wanted to tell his story to an
attorney first.' °6 An officer responded by explaining to Thompson
that the attorney could not tell his story to the police and that the
attorney would probably advise him to not give a statement. 07
Thompson subsequently gave the officer his statement, which was
used against him at his trial. 08 The court of appeals held that
98. Id. at 204. In a pretrial hearing, the trial judge ruled that the confessions
were voluntary and that Maglio had intelligently and knowingly waived his right
to an attorney. Id.
99. Id. The court of appeals reiterated that courts indulge in every reasonable
presumption against a waiver of the Fifth Amendment right to counsel and that
the burden to prove a waiver is on the State. Id. at 204-05.
100. M. at 205 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445, (1966)).
101. Maglio, 580 F.2d at 208.
102. Shreffler, supra note 91, at 469.
103. Shreffler, supra note 91, at 468.
104. 601 F.2d 768 (5th Cir. 1979).
105. Id. at 769. Thompson was arrested for stabbing the night manager of a
restaurant after Thompson attempted to steal cash from the register. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. One of the interrogating officers testified that "[tihe only thing he said
was he would like to tell his attorney first and we told him he could tell us just
as well and that his attorney would not be able to tell us what he said so he
wanted to tell us himself." Id. at n.2.
108. Id. at 769-70. The statement was used to corroborate the testimony of an
eyewitness and to impeach Thompson's own testimony. Id. at 770.
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Thompson's conviction must be reversed and remanded. 10 9 The court
established its approach to the ambiguous reference to counsel dilemma
by stating that whenever a suspect makes even an ambiguous request
for counsel during a custodial interrogation, the officers must
immediately clarify the request until its meaning is clearly
understood.'10
The third approach, called either the "Threshold Standard of
Clarity" or the "Totality of Circumstances" test, required the suspect's
request to be sufficiently clear in order for a court to find the right
to counsel had been invoked."' This approach shifted the burden
to the suspect to establish clarity by presuming that the suspect did
not invoke the right to counsel whenever an ambiguous statement
is made." 2 This view is exemplified by the Illinois case, People v.
Krueger."' The case concerned a defendant who said, "Maybe I
ought to have an attorney," during a custodial interrogation."
'4
Subsequently, the defendant made incriminating statements that were
introduced as evidence at his trial." 5 In determining whether this
statement properly invoked his right to counsel, the court
acknowledged that his reference to counsel technically was covered
by Miranda's "in any manner" language." 6 Nevertheless, the Illinois
court reasoned that the United States Supreme Court did not intend
for any and every reference, regardless of its vagueness or ambiguity,
to be interpreted as an invocation to the right to counsel." 7 The
Illinois Supreme Court upheld the trial court's decision to admit
the evidence and affirmed the defendant's conviction."
8
109. Id. at 772. "Thompson's incriminating statement, taken under [these] cir-
cumstances . . . and after he was misled into abandoning his equivocal request for
counsel, was gotten in violation of Miranda." Id.
110. Id. at 771. "Further questioning thereafter must be limited to clarifying
that request until it is clarified." Id.
111. Shreffler, supra note 91, at 469. See, e.g., People v. Krueger, 412 N.E.2d
537 (1980) (supporting the view that a suspect must meet the minimum threshold
of clarity to have effectively invoked the Fifth Amendment right to counsel).
112. Shreffler, supra note 91, at 468.
113. 412 N.E.2d 537 (I11. 1980).
114. Id. at 540. Three officers testified that during the custodial interrogation,
Krueger said either, "Maybe I ought to have a lawyer," "Maybe I need a lawyer,"
or "Maybe I ought to talk to an attorney." Id.
115. Id. at 539. Krueger was tried and convicted of murder, although maintaining
a defense of self-defense. Id.
116. Id. at 540 (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45). The Miranda Court stated
that if a suspect "indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that
he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning."
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45.
117. Krueger, 412 N.E.2d at 540.
118. Id. at 540-41. "[W]hile we are sensitive to the requirement that authorities
refrain from interrogation whenever a suspect invokes his right to counsel, we find
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Noting that the issue concerning ambiguous or equivocal
references to counsel during an in-custody interrogation had not
been specifically addressed, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Davis v. United States"9 to resolve the conflicts between the three
differing approaches in the lower courts. 20
IV. REASONING OF THE COURT IN DAVIS
The Supreme Court chose to adopt the "Threshold Standard
of Clarity" approach, concluding that when a suspect makes an
ambiguous statement concerning a desire for counsel during inter-
rogation, law enforcement officers may continue asking questions
until the suspect clearly requests counsel) 21 The Court reiterated that
the right to counsel is not a constitutional right' but rather a
judicially created measure to ensure protection of the Fifth Amend-
ment right against compulsory self-incrimination,1 23 which was es-
tablished by Miranda v. Arizona 24 and Edwards v. Arizona. 25 The
Court refused to accept the petitioner's argument that law enforce-
ment officers must cease interrogation immediately if the suspect
makes any reference to an attorney.126 After Davis, law enforcement
officers continue to be free to interrogate the suspect provided that,
after he receives Miranda warnings, he effectively waives his right
that defendant's remarks here did not constitute an invocation of such right." Id.
at 540.
119. 114 S. Ct. 2350 (1994).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 2356. The Court noted that, even though this case arose in the
military court system, the Court of Military Appeals had previously held that United
States Supreme Court cases concerning the Fifth Amendment right to counsel
applied within the military judicial system. Id. at 2354 n.l. See, e.g., United States
v. McLaren, 38 M.J. 112, 115 (1993) (employing the holdings from Edwards v.
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) and Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990) to
determine whether the defendant's request was equivocal in a military court pro-
ceeding).
122. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2354. The pronouncement that the right to counsel
stemming from the Fifth Amendment is not a constitutional right is potentially
problematic. Unless the right to counsel based on the Fifth Amendment is a
fundamental right required by the Constitution, the Supreme Court cannot mandate
that state courts recognize it because judicially created measures do not bind state
courts. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§§ 2.2 to 2.6 (2d ed. 1992) (giving a thorough explanation of the Selective In-
corporation Doctrine).
123. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2354. "No person ... shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CoNrsT. amend. 5.
124. 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that suspects subject to custodial questioning
have the right to both consultation with an attorney and to have an attorney
present during questioning).
125. 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (holding that the custodial interrogation must end once
the suspect has invoked the right to counsel).
126. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2355.
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to counsel.' 27 Nevertheless, as in Edwards, if at any time during the
questioning, the suspect decides to request an attorney, the inter-
rogation must be discontinued until counsel has been made available
.or until the suspect, on his own, re-initiates the conversation .
2
1
In rejecting the petitioner's argument that law enforcement of-
ficers should be required to cease interrogation immediately when
any reference to an attorney is made, the Court reasoned that this
policy would prevent law enforcement officers from interrogating in
the absence of an attorney, even if the suspect does not desire to
have counsel present. 29 Calling the Edwards provision a "second
layer of prophylaxis for the Miranda right to counsel," the Court
stated that its purpose is to prevent law enforcement officers from
coercing the suspect into waiving his Miranda rights, which had been
previously asserted, not to halt the interrogation needlessly because
of non-specific references to counsel. 30
The Court recognized that in applying the Edwards rule, lower
courts will be required to determine whether the suspect did or did
not assert his right to counsel. 3 ' The test is objective in order to
avoid problems of proof and to give guidance to the officers who
conduct the interrogations.'3 2 While the Court does not require the
suspect to "speak with the discrimination of an Oxford don," he
must communicate his wish to assert his right clearly enough for
reasonable law enforcement officers to understand that he is re-
questing counsel.' When the suspect makes a statement that does
not clearly indicate this wish, the Davis majority held that the officers
are not required by Edwards to end the interrogation. 3
4
The Court noted that the requirement of a clear assertion of
the right to counsel may put some to a disadvantage, namely those
who will not be able to express their wish clearly, whether due to
127. Id. at 2354.
128. Id. at 2354-55.
129. Id. at 2356.
130. Id. at 2355 (citing McNeil v. Wisconsin, 494 U.S. 344, 350 (1990)). The
Court pointed out that Edwards does not require that counsel be provided when
the suspect consents to answer questions in the absence of an attorney. Id. at
2356.
131. Id. at 2355 (citing Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95 (1984) (per curiam)).
132. Id. at 2356.
133. Id. at 2355. The Davis Court noted that in Smith, 469 U.S. at 97-98, the
opinion observed that a suspect's statement is either "an assertion of the right to




fear, intimidation, lack of linguistic skill, or any other reason. 35
Nevertheless, the Court asserted that when the suspect fully com-
prehends the rights to remain silent and to request counsel, this
understanding is adequate to dispel any coercion that may exist in
the interrogation process.
3 6
The Court then considered the law enforcement dilemma that
results from the Miranda rule, noting that ultimately it is the officers
who must determine whether the suspect can be questioned. 3 7 The
Court found that the Edwards rule, which stops the interrogation
once the right to counsel has been asserted, provides a clear guideline
to officers, thus making the decision less of a judgment call.' 38 This
need for an easily applied rule is one of the major factors contributing
to the Court's holding that officers may continue with interrogation
until the suspect clearly requests counsel. 3 9
The Court declined to hold that when a criminal suspect makes
an ambiguous statement concerning counsel, the officers must attempt
to clarify whether the statement is truly a request for an attorney.1
4
0
Although the Court suggested that this procedure would help ensure
that the suspect's rights are protected and minimize the possibility
of the confession being judicially suppressed, the Court clearly re-
jected the position that the officers are under a legal obligation to
ask the necessary questions to make the suspect's wishes clear.' 4'
Justice Souter, joined by Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Gins-
berg, concurred with the judgment of the majority but disagreed in
the conclusion that law enforcement officers have no legal obligation
to ask the necessary questions in order to clarify any ambiguous
statements concerning an attorney made by a suspect. 14 2 Justice Souter
135. Id. at 2356.
136. Id. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 427 (1986) (stating that "full
coprchcsion of the rights to remain silent and equest an attorney [is] sufficient
to dispel whatever coercion is inherent in the interrogation process").
137. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2356.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 2355.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 2358-64 (Souter, J., joined by Blackmun, J., Stevens, J., and Ginsberg,
J., concurring). Justice Scalia also wrote a concurring opinion, taking issue with
the omission of 18 U.S.C. § 3501 in the legal analysis of this case. Id. at 2357
(Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia wrote that "[l]egal analysis of the admissibility
of a confession without reference to these provisions is equivalent to legal analysis
of the admissibility of hearsay without consulting the Rules of Evidence; it is an
unreal exercise." Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1988).
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asserted that this holding is contrary to the precedent and judgments
of the many Courts before them which have addressed this issue.
143
His concurring opinion was strongly in favor of supporting the
Miranda case law, which is based on fairness and practicality.'" He
advocated adopting the rule that once law enforcement officers are
reasonably unable to discern whether or not the suspect is asking
for counsel, the interrogation should stop until the suspect's wishes
are made clear. 145 Justice Souter argued that the majority's decision,
tested against three decades of case law, fails to uphold two major
precepts concerning the relationship between officers and suspects
during custodial interrogations: the protection of the suspect's right
to either speech or silence throughout the questioning process and
the need for practical application in a real world situation.' 46 Justice
Souter asserted that requiring officers to stop interrogation until
they determine whether the suspect is asking for legal representation
would fulfill both goals of the broad Miranda principles.147 It would
protect the suspect from an infringement of the right to counsel
and provide a practical approach that can help avoid misunder-
standings leading to inadmissibility.
48
Justice Souter's concurring opinion took issue with the require-
ment that the suspect clearly indicate to the officers his wish for
counsel, pointing out that a substantial number of suspects lack a
firm grasp of the English language, 49 are ignorant, 50 or become so
overwhelmed by the circumstances that they are unable to speak
assertively. 5' Justice Souter believed that this requirement of clear
143. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2359 (Souter, J., concurring).
144. Id. (Souter, J. concurring).
145. Id. (Souter, J. concurring).
146. Id. at 2359-60 (Souter, J., concurring). See Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S.
523, 528 (1987) (stating that "the fundamental purpose of the Court's decision in
Miranda was 'to assure that the individual's right to choose between speech and
silence remains unfettered throughout the interrogation process"').
147. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2360 (Souter, J., concurring).
148. Id. See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 110 n.2 (1975) (White, J.,
concurring) (noting that once the suspect has "expressed his own view that he is
not competent to deal with the authorities without legal advice, a later decision
at the authorities' insistence to make a statement may properly be viewed with
skepticism").
149. See United States v. De la Jara, 973 F.2d 746, 750 (9th Cir. 1992) (involving
a Peruvian defendant who requested an attorney in Spanish, which depending on
the inflection could be either an assertion or merely a question).
150. See Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 742 (1966) (involving an im-
poverished defendant of low mentality with a third or fourth grade education).
151. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2361 n.4 (Souter, J., concurring). Social science confirms
that "individuals who feel intimidated or powerless are more likely to speak in
equivocal or nonstandard terms when no ambiguity or equivocation is meant." Id.
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and unambiguous requests places too great a burden on those who
may not be capable of carrying such a burden, which is the underlying
basis for adopting the Miranda protection rules.5 2
Concerning the need for practical application, Justice Souter
acknowledged that every approach will involve a certain amount of
individual judgment.153 Nevertheless, the approach he advocated would
allow the judgment call to be made, not by the officers in charge,
but by the suspect himself, the one whom Justice Souter asserted
that prior case law has assumed should make that decision.1
5 4
V. SIGNIFICANCE
This opinion, which holds that officers do not have to discon-
tinue questioning or ask clarifying questions when an ambiguous
reference to counsel is made by a suspect, is significant because it
gives the lower courts and law enforcement officers a standard to
apply, ending the dispute between the differing approaches taken
by the lower courts. This opinion is also significant because it cannot
be easily reconciled with the line of precedent concerning the Fifth
Amendment right to counsel.'55 First, Davis violates the policy behind
Miranda, which is concerned with both the individual's constitutional
rights and the need for objective guidelines for interrogating officers.
Second, Davis does not fit within the Johnson v. Zerbst5 6 standard
for effective waivers, which requires that the waiver be knowing and
voluntary. 5 7 Finally, the Davis opinion opens the door to discrim-
ination against certain classes of individuals.'
A. Miranda Policy Concerns
The double purpose of Miranda, to protect the suspect's
constitutional rights and to prevent the inadmissibility of confessions,
has been circumvented by the holding in Davis, rendering both to
uncertainty and confusion. First, Miranda states that if a suspect
indicates "in any manner" that he wants to speak with an attorney
before engaging in any interrogation, then there can be no more
152. Id. at 2360. See Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 633 (1986) (noting
that the State has the burden of establishing that the suspect made a valid waiver).
153. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2363 (Souter, J., concurring).
154. Id. (Souter, J. concurring).
155. Id. at 2359.
156. 304 U.S. 458 (1937).
157. Id. at 464.
158. Janet E. Ainsworth, In A Different Register: The Pragmatics Of Power-
lessness In Police Interrogations, 103 YALE L.J. 259, 263, 315-19 (1993).
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questioning. 5 9 This "in any manner" standard has been disregarded,
if not completely overruled, by the holding in Davis.160 An ambiguous
reference potentially can be a request that should fall within the
"in any manner" spectrum.16' By disregarding the ambiguous reference
and continuing the interrogation, the suspect's rights are being violated
if the reference was intended to invoke the suspect's rights. After
Davis, the suspect must now assume the burden for asserting his
rights by making certain that the interrogating officers clearly
understand what his wishes are. 62 Additionally, it is not clear what
the threshold for clarity really is; different jurisdictions are free to
develop their own standard for clarity and contribute more uncertainty
than before Davis.
63
Second, from the perspective of law enforcement, this opinion
gives the interrogating officers wide latitude by allowing them to
determine if the suspect has unambiguously requested counsel. It
allows room for abuse by trained officers to decide that a request
is ambiguous enough to continue questioning although realizing the
true intent of the reference, thus raising the standard of clarity in
order to continue the interrogation.' 64 Officers are essentially able
to manipulate the suspect who makes an ambiguous request into
further interrogation. 65 Also, the officers who do attempt to preserve
the suspect's rights are not given guidance as to when a reference
to counsel has reached the threshold of clarity.' 66
B. Johnson v. Zerbst Standard For Waiver Disregarded
The Johnson v. Zerbst167 standard that requires a knowing,
intentional, and voluntary waiver has been disregarded by the Court's
159. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966).
160. Matthew W. D. Bowman, Note, The Right To Counsel During Custodial
Interrogation: Equivocal References To An Attorney - Determining What State-
ments Or Conduct Should Constitute An Accused's Invocation Of The Right To
Counsel. 39 VAND. L. REV. 1159, 1188 (1986).
161. Id.
162. Interview with Thomas Sullivan, Professor of Law, University of Arkansas
at Little Rock School of Law in Little Rock, Arkansas, October 19, 1994.
163. Bowman, supra note 160, at 1191.
164. Bowman, supra note 160, at 1190. For a contrary view, see Fred Schlosser,
Note, The Fifth Amendment Right Against Self-Incrimination: An Individual's
Right Versus The Government's Need For Effective Law Enforcement 16 S. ILL.
U. L.J. 197 (1991) (stating that "the importance of confessions and the use of
'ordinary unethical' practices are necessary for effective law enforcement" and that
"the Fourteenth Amendment is adequate to protect an individual from police
excess").
165. Sullivan, supra note 162. See supra note 107 for an example of this potential
manipulation problem.
166. Bowman, supra note 160, at 1190.
167. 304 U.S. 458 (1937).
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refusal to require law enforcement officers to ask clarifying questions
to determine what the suspect meant by the ambiguous reference to
an attorney. 6 By disregarding the ambiguous reference, the officers
are, in effect, assuming that the suspect continues to waive his rights
to an attorney. 69 This assumption does not fit the requirements of
a valid waiver as set forth in Johnson v. Zerbst170 Once the suspect
makes an ambiguous reference to counsel, it is no longer clear
whether the suspect's waiver continues to be knowing, voluntary or
intentional. No one but the suspect knows whether the continuation
of the interrogation is truly voluntary. 7 ' In addition, the Davis
holding does not adhere to the related rule also from Johnson v.
Zerbst that courts are to indulge in every reasonable presumption
against the waiver of a fundamental constitutional right and are not
to presume acquiescence in the loss of a fundamental right. 7 2 Instead,
the Davis approach presumes that the suspect has not invoked his
rights and presumes a continuing waiver. 73 "The officers should be
under a duty to determine whether the suspect intends to continue
waiving his Fifth Amendment right to counsel or whether, in fact,
the suspect intends to invoke that right.
C. Potential Discriminatory Effects
Finally, the Davis majority opinion opens up the door to potential
discrimination of several classes of suspects, namely women, 74 ethnic
168. Sullivan, supra note 162.
169. Sullivan, supra note 162.
170. See Anne Elizabeth Link, Fifth Amendment-The Constitutionality of Cus-
todial Confessions, 82 J. CRLM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 878, 898 (1992) (noting that
"[the Zerbst standard that waivers must be knowingly and intelligently waived is
easily manipulated depending on the practical and theoretical viewpoints of the
members of the majority in any given case").
171. See Rhonda Y. Cline, Comment, Equivocal Requests For Counsel: A Balance
Of Competing Policy Considerations, 55 U. CIN. L. REv. 767, 779 (1987). The
author notes that "it is reasonable to infer that if a waiver of the right to counsel
need not be explicit, then neither should an invocation of that right be required
to be explicit. If courts require a clear statement, they are placing form above the
fact that the accused is expressing a need for legal representation." Id.
172. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1937). The Davis Court dodges this
rule by characterizing the Fifth Amendment right to counsel as a judicially created
measure rather than a constitutional right. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2354. However,
this view has a potential pitfall, the doctrine of Selective Incorporation. Unless the
Fifth Amendment right to counsel is required by the Constitution, it cannot be
imposed on state courts as Miranda is. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD
H. ISRAEL, CImINAL PROCEDURE §§ 2.2 to 2.6 (2d. ed. 1992) (giving a thorough
explanation of the doctrine of Selective Incorporation).
173. Shreffler, supra note 91, at 468.
174. Ainsworth, supra note 158, at 261.
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minorities, 75 those with lower intelligence, 176 and those with less
experience in the criminal justice system. 17 7 This discrimination becomes
possible by requiring suspects to make the request for counsel in
the imperative or direct form of speech rather than by question
form. 7 Research in the area of sociolinguistics has shown that large
portions of the population use indirect speech patterns. 179 This has
been shown to be particularly true of women and ethnic minorities,
two groups who have historically been much less powerful in society. 80
Additionally, during a custodial interrogation, a suspect may feel
as though he is powerless. 8 ' Often, those suspects will use indirect
speech patterns when attempting to invoke their rights. 112 The irony
of the rule in Davis is that although these protective rules were
established to protect suspects from police abuse of power, the reality
is that the least powerful suspects are the ones provided with the
least amount of protection.8 3
Although the majority opinion is significant because it sets forth
a uniform rule for the lower courts to follow when determining
whether a custodial statement should be admitted into evidence, it
represents a clear departure from the line of precedent involving the
administration of a suspect's Miranda rights and the standards by
which a waiver of those rights is valid. This decision provides for
less constitutional protection for suspects and gives the interrogating
officers more freedom when deciding whether the interrogation should
continue. Essentially, Davis denies protection to those least able to
175. Ainsworth, supra note 158, at 261. See also United States v. De La Jara,
973 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1992) (involving a suspect who requested an attorney in
Spanish with a phrase that could be interpreted as either a question or an assertion).
176. See, e.g., Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966) (involving a defendant
with a third or fourth grade education and such a low level of intelligence that
the lower court considered whether a person of such low mentality should be
executed).
177. Sullivan, supra note 162. Professor Sullivan commented that those suspects
who have been through the criminal system before are much more likely to know
and understand their rights and how to exercise them properly. In effect, the Davis
rule rewards the repeat offenders. Sullivan, supra note 162.
178. Ainsworth, supra note 158, at 304.
179. Ainsworth, supra note 158, at 261. See, e.g., People v. Santiago, 519
N.Y.S.2d 413 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987)(involving a suspect who said, "Will you
supply a lawyer now so that I may ask him should I continue with this interview
at this moment?" which was held to be an invalid invocation of the right to
counsel), aff'd, 530 N.Y.S.2d 546 (1988).
180. Ainsworth, supra note 158, at 261.
181. Ainsworth, supra note 158, at 261.
182. Ainsworth, supra note 158, at 261.
183. Ainsworth, supra note 158, at 261.
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protect themselves. 8 4 The experienced criminal, who understands his
rights and how to exercise them properly, benefits much more from
this approach as compared to the young, intellectually challenged,
weak, culturally oppressed, and perhaps, the innocent.'
85
Melissa Beard Glover
184. Sullivan, supra note 162.
185. Sullivan, supra notes 162 and 177.
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